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This study examines the relationship between Bumiputra (in reference to Malay 
indigenous race) directors, a proxy for culture and analysts forecast. In addition, the 
study investigates whether corporate governance affects that relationship. Based on a 
sample from 1999 to 2009 and 664 observations, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between culture and analysts forecast error suggesting that Bumiputra 
directors lead to less transparent information environment. However, we find limited 
evidence to support that good governance weakens the positive relationship between 
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1. Introduction  
Financial analysts are important players in the capital market. Their role in 
analysing information, either publicly and privately obtained is crucial in determining 
the progress of firms, especially in terms of quality of earnings. There are abundance 
of research on role of financial analysts in the capital market with such focus on 
analysts' forecasts, analysts’ coverage and the effect on future income (see Bradshaw, 
2011; Ramnath et al., 2008 for review of literature on analysts’ research). In addition, 
many studies examined the determinants of analysts’ forecasts. However, evidence 
has been limited in relation to examining the impact of cultural values of earning 
forecasts. Our sample country, Malaysia represents this opportunity in examining 
whether such association exist between cultural values and analysts forecasts.  
Cultural values according to Storz (1999) assisted in shaping attitudes and 
business practices. Within a multicultural business setting such as Malaysia, the 
influence of cultural values is an important factor for the development of the 
Malaysian capital market. The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 
1970 was loosely based on the wealth inequality among the ethnic groups in 
Malaysia. The main aim of NEP is to enhance the Bumiputra shareholdings in the 
capital market by various means.1 Among them are by setting up institutional funds to 
support local companies and businesses, which are primarily run by Bumiputras. The 
Malaysian government policy itself was seen as positive discrimination (Gomez & 
                                                          
1 The term Bumiputra or ‘sons of the soil’ was popularized during the 1920s and 1930s by the British 
colony to distinguish the indigenous people of Malaya (now Malaysia), the majority of whom are 
Malays, from the Chinese or Indian immigrants, the non-indigenous people. Article 160 (2) of the 
Malaysian Constitution 1957 defines Malays as a person, who professes the religion of Islam, 
habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay custom. 
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Jomo, 1999), but on one hand, the assistance is much needed to reduce wealth 
imbalance among ethnics.  
 Pryor (2007) argues that when economic institutions are not imposed by force, 
the cultural characteristics are more likely to determine the economic system, rather 
than economic institutions. This statement is partially true when we examine the 
studies of Mitton (2002) and Bushman et al. (2004) which suggest that Malaysia is 
weak in legal enforcement. We could argue that due to the relatively weak legal 
enforcement of rules and regulations of the capital market, cultural characteristics will 
take precedence in business dealings, and shapes the capital market.  
Ethnicity has been closely related to cultural values. One would expect that 
various races or ethnic groups are subjected to their cultural values, and clearly 
differentiated from national culture. Malaysia is a country that represents such unique 
case of various cultures based on its multi-racial groups. Various studies have 
examined the effect of culture in Malaysia on the capital market. There are two 
strands of research on culture in Malaysia. The first strand of research focuses on the 
well-established Hofstede-Gray framework on the link between cultural values and 
the development of accounting values. The rationale behind the Hofstede-Gray 
framework is accounting choices are affected by cultural values. Gray (1988) 
developed accounting values based on Hofstede (1980) cultural values.2 Gray (1988) 
argues that cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980) influence a country's 
accounting system in two ways; (1) through their influence on a country's institutions 
                                                          
2 We admit that there has been some concern raised by the academic world regarding Hofstede 
understanding on culture. Please see Baskerville (2003) and Baskerville-Morley (2005) for some 
arguments against Hofstede cultural studies. Although we admit limitations exists, at the same time we 
believe that the cultural dimensions offered by Hofstede is the best current cultural dimension model 
that could be used in capital market research.  
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such as its capital market and ; (2) through their influence on accounting values, such 
as conservatism, that are shared by members of the accounting subculture within a 
country (Doupnik, 2008).3  
The outcome of the Hofstede-Gray framework suggests that Bumiputra 
directors are less compliant to regulations, secretive and will have lower level of 
disclosure as relative to Chinese directors. The seminal work of Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) examine the relationship between cultural values and corporate governance 
disclosure in Malaysia. Contrary to their prediction based on the Hofstede-Gray 
framework, they find that Chinese directors are secretive and risk averse relative to 
the Bumiputra which reflected on the corporate governance disclosure. Other studies 
examine the relationship between culture with earnings quality (Abdul Rahman & 
Mohammad Ali, 2006; Mohamed Yunos  et al., 2012), audit related studies (Che 
Ahmad et al., 2006; Syed Mustapha Nazri et al., 2012), and corporate governance 
(Salleh et al., 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Abdul Wahab et al., 2007). These studies rely 
on the Hofstede-Gray framework which argues that Bumiputras have lower level of 
disclosure and low level of legal compliance. The results of these studies are rather 
consistent throughout, and give support to the framework which link Hofstede cultural 
values with accounting values.  
The second strand of cultural research is closely tailored to the early 
development of the capital market in Malaysia. Since the development of the capital 
market is loosely based on racial ground, studies have also treated different groups 
that have access to preferential treatment from the government. Gul (2006) examines 
the relationship between political connections and audit fees in Malaysia in which he 
                                                          
3 Please see Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004) for a critical review of Gray (1988) accounting values.  
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adopts Bumiputra directors as a proxy for connected firms. Johl et al. (2012) 
investigate the characteristics of the CEO ethnicity and audit fees.  Abdul Wahab et 
al. (2014) adopt similar approach when examining the issue of non-audit fees and 
auditor independence. The premise of these papers is that the preferential treatment 
connected firms get, proxied by Bumiputra directors will lead to the firm being riskier 
and inefficient. This is further supported by financial reporting quality studies such as 
Bushman et al. (2004) and the possible bailout by government for connected firms 
(Faccio et al., 2006).  
Both strand of research provide a distinctive consensus.  They find companies 
that are dominated by Bumiputra directors will have lower level of governance, less 
transparent and inefficient. These factors will influence the quality of financial 
reporting and thus affect the information environment.  Therefore, we want to 
investigate the relationship between cultural values and analysts forecast error, which 
is a good proxy for the level of information environment in the capital market. The 
premise of such relationship is simple; there is positive relationship between cultural 
values and the analysts forecast error and this implies that cultural values will lead to 
less accurate earnings forecast.  
Financial analysts or sell-side analysts provide an excellent avenue to test the 
quality of financial information in the capital market. They provide a better proxy for 
the nature of independence in determining whether the firm is progressing well in 
their operations. Financial analysts depend on the amount of information made 
available by the firms either by means of publicly available information or purchased 
materials. Firms with better governance, heavily dependent on non-governmental 
resources or independent funding will signal better information and higher level of 
7 
 
transparency, as observed by Abdul Wahab et al. (2007). Hence, analysts will have 
better and more information to make forecasts of future earnings.  
Another important element in recent changes in Malaysia’s capital market is 
the progress of corporate governance reforms. The primary reason for corporate 
governance reform in Malaysia was to boost investors’ confidence, especially during 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. Among the government’s initiatives are to enhance 
governance structures and transparency with the introduction of Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance in 2001, the introduction of Minority Shareholders Watchdog 
Group lead by top local institutional investors, primarily to protect minority interests, 
and compulsory training for directors in relation to corporate governance. These 
initiatives manage to enhance transparency (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007), and increase 
level of earnings quality and disclosure (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
Studies have examined the effect of corporate governance in Malaysia's capital 
market. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance in which they find board size and top five (5) 
institutional shareholdings to be significantly associated with both market and 
accounting performance measures in Malaysia. Based on a composite index of various 
corporate governance measures, Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) find a positive and 
significant relationship with corporate governance index and market adjusted returns. 
Morris et al. (2011) investigate the effect of corporate governance before and after the 
Asian Financial Crisis. Based on two sample period of 1996 and 2001, they find 
corporate governance is more value relevant after the Asian Financial Crisis. These 
studies suggest that corporate governance does matter in Malaysia.  
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 The above present an interesting institutional setting in Malaysia. A ‘clash’ of 
cultural values and government efforts in enhancing level of information in the capital 
market, presents a case suitable for investigation. The Malaysian institutional settings 
provide a good avenue to test whether the mix of cultural values and rules and 
regulations by the government, especially in enforcing governance matters. The 
relationship between corporate governance and forecast accuracy is negatively 
expected, and thus one would expect the negative relationship between cultural values 
and forecast accuracy will be weaker for firms with good governance.  
  The issue of financial reporting quality in Malaysia is the main driver for 
choice of financial analysts forecast. Scarcity in earnings predictability studies in 
Malaysia made this research timely and further extent the current literature. Further, 
financial analysts have strong influence in the market place. Their recommendations 
could influence firm’s prices, strategic decisions and market value. In addition, 
financial analysts have strong influence on portfolio fund managers around the world. 
Therefore, the accuracy of such analysts is of great importance. Studies on analysts 
forecast in Malaysia have been limited to examination based on multiple countries. 
Hope (2003) examines the relationship between disclosure practices and analysts 
forecast for 22 countries, Malaysia included. Yu (2010) conducts a similar study by 
examining the relationship between analysts’ forecasts properties, analysts following 
and governance disclosure. Ang and Ma (2001) examine the behaviour of financial 
analysts in four Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia 
during the financial crisis. Coen and Desfluers (2004) and Coen et al. (2005) examine 
the characteristics or determinants of analysts' forecasts in eight Asian emerging 
economies.  Ahmad Zaluki and Wan Hussin (2010) examine the relationship between 
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corporate governance and management earnings forecast during initial public 
offering. Ahmad Zaluki and Wan Hussin (2010) paper remains the sole paper that 
focus on (management) earnings forecast in Malaysia and this makes a sound 
motivation for this study.  
 Our study has some incremental contributions. First, we extend the work of 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) as we examine the role of culture, based on the Hofstede-
Gray framework against analysts forecast. Secondly, we add to the existing literature 
by investigating the interrelationship between culture, corporate governance and 
analysts forecast in Malaysia. 
 Based on a sample of 664 observations for a sample of 1999 to 2009, we find 
a positive and significant relationship between the percentage of Bumiputra directors 
and forecast error. These suggest that culture, proxied by Bumiputra directors 
influence the level of financial information in the capital market. We find a positive 
relationship between the total board directors and forecast error and this outcome 
suggest that bigger boards are less effective in relations to good governance. 
However, our extended analysis could not lend any support that corporate governance 
mitigates the positive relationship posited between culture and forecast error.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Institutional background discussing on 
Malaysia’s socio and political economy and the recent development on corporate 
governance is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents arguments for our empirical 
predictions while Section 4 discussed the research method and data description. 
Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Institutional Background 
 
2.1 Malaysia socio and political economy 
 
Malaysian corporate ownership is divided into groups of ethnicity such as 
Malays, Chinese, Indian and other small minority groups. The group of ethnicity are 
divided into ethnic lines which can be clearly observed in the listed firm whose  share 
ownership and board membership are dominated by two main ethnic groups namely 
Bumiputra Malays and the Chinese (Yatim et al., 2006).4  
In Malaysia, although Indian is one of the main ethnic groups, the power in 
socio-economic activities and political policy making are denominated by Bumiputra 
Malays and Chinese (Yatim, et al., 2006). Every ethnicity has their own believes and 
ideology which influences the way of thinking, decision making and direction of an 
organisation. The term Bumiputra was coined by the British to differentiate between 
the indigenous (Malays) and the non-indigenous people of the then Malaya, now 
Malaysia. Mohammad Yusuf (2012) states three important premises on why there is a 
need to differentiate between Bumiputras and non-Bumiputras, although Malaysia is 
no longer a British colony. The first premise is the basis for division lies in the belief 
that Bumiputras having an indigenous status do not have a share in the economy that 
reflect their proportion in the population  while the second premise is that the 
government policies should be oriented to redress this economic imbalance. The third 
premise is, it is believed that a more equitable participation of Bumiputras will help to 
                                                          
4 In 2008, Malaysia's population was at 28,882 million people in which Bumiputras account for nearly 




promote political stability. Historical factors and cultural characteristics appear to 
have significant impact on the development of the capital market. Mansor and 
Kennedy (2000) state that Malay cultural values have developed from a history of 
communal living and cooperation and are often viewed as being high on collectivism. 
One could argue that this historical premise lead to weak entrepreneurial skills as 
relative to other ethnic groups in Malaysia.  
In contrast, Chinese leaders show remarkably high leadership skill and 
successfully lead their businesses into professionally-managed organisation. In 
addition, the Chinese also create protection surrounding their business by making 
connections with Malays prior to the introduction of the NEP in 1970 (White, 2004). 
Ball et al. (2003) reported that the Chinese controlled nearly 69 percent of market 
capitalisation, although their population stands at only 29 percent in Malaysia. 
Statistical figures have shown that the Bumiputra shareholdings in the capital market 
have been increasing steadily over the years, especially after the implementation of 
NEP. As at 2008, Bumiputra shareholdings stand at 21.9 percent, short of the 30 
percent targeted earlier by the government.5  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance initiatives in Malaysia 
 
The topic of corporate governance is not new in Malaysia. However in the 
past, or specifically before the Asian Financial Crisis, the main corporate governance 
mechanisms relied on the rules and regulations imposed by the regulators in Malaysia.  
This is in part probably due to the lack of market for corporate control 
(takeovers, mergers) in Malaysia (Faccio et al., 2006). As such, these regulations are 
                                                          
5 Please see Appendix A for shareholdings distribution.  
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largely to enforce good governance and ensure the company actually follows the rule 
of law. Among the acts are Companies Act (1965), the Securities Commission Act 
(1993), Financial Services Act (2013), Islamic Financial Services Act (2013) and also 
the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement. In addition, Malaysia became the first Asian 
country to set up an independent accounting standard setting body, the Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board (MASB) under the provisions of Financial Reporting Act 
(1997). The mission of MASB is to promote quality financial reporting and thus 
ensuring adequacy to the needs of users of the capital markets. These bodies act as a 
stepping stone for further improvement of corporate governance in the market. For 
instance, the Securities Commission Act established in 1993 acts as a watchdog to 
improve the legal framework of the capital market. Further, in 1993, the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange Requirement required that listed firms must set up an audit 
committee of at least three individuals, comprising a majority of independent 
directors. In 1996, the Registrar of Companies introduced the Code of Ethics for 
directors. These initiatives are some of the efforts made prior to the Asian Financial 
Crisis to ensure effective corporate governance.  
Further events especially during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 initiated a 
more concerted effort by the government to ensure depth in corporate governance 
practices. It started with the establishment of the Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (FCCG) by the Malaysian Securities Commission which then lead to the 
introduction of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2001 (MCCG). The 
MCCG is currently part of the listing requirement based on the comply-or-explain 
basis. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) provide initial evidence on the effectiveness of such 
regulations on corporate governance disclosure and firm performance. They find after 
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2001, listed firms corporate disclosure increase and this resulted in better firm 
performance, measured by market adjusted returns. Subsequent study by Abdul 
Wahab et al. (2008) finds that good governing firms attract a higher level of 
institutional investors. The MCCG went through several other revisions. Notably, 
revision in 2007, widely known as MCCG 2007, enhances the role of nomination 
committee and requires at least one member of audit committee to be financial literate 
with commitment towards an accounting association or body. The primary motivation 
for various corporate governance initiatives is to enhance investors’ confidence in 
terms of rules of law governing the firms.  
 
3. Empirical Predictions 
3.1 Cultural Values and Analysts Forecast Error 
 
We offer two arguments on the relationship between cultural values, based on 
the two strand of research discussed earlier. The first argument is socio-economy 
argument while the second one is political-economy argument. The socio-economy 
argument resides on the Hofstede-Gray framework that links cultural values with 
accounting values. Culture is define as learned, socially acquired traditions and life 
style of the members of a society, including their patterned, repetitious way of 
thinking, feeling and acting (Harris, 1987).  Chuah (1995) finds Malaysian managers 
are influenced by race, education and type of organisation that they work for. 
Hofstede and Gray theoretical framework is often used to relate cultural value and 
accounting system (Perera, 1989; Fechner et al., 1994; Willet et al., 1995; Haniffa & 
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Cooke, 2002). Hofstede-Gray theoretical framework explained the characteristic of 
Bumiputra (Malay) and Chinese culture values and accounting disclosure information. 
Table 1 presents the framework that relates Hofstede cultural dimensions with Gray's 
accounting values. The four cultural dimensions are power (1) power distance; (2) 
masculinity; (3) uncertainty avoidance, and (4) individualism.6 Gray (1988) then 
developed accounting values based on these cultural dimensions. The accounting 
values are (1) professionalism versus statutory control; (2) uniformity versus 
flexibility; (3) conservatism versus optimism and (4) secrecy versus transparency.7  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The framework shows that Bumiputra directors experience high level of power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance while low level of masculinity and individualism. 
These cultural traits of Bumiputra directors resulted in low level of professionalism 
                                                          
6 Hofstede (1980) cultural dimensions: 
i. Power distance: the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. 
ii. Masculinity: refers to a society in which gender roles are distinct with me expected to 
be tough and assertive.  
iii. Uncertainty avoidance: the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by 
uncertain or unknown situations.  
iv. Individualism: refers to a society wherein ties between members are relatively loose.  
 
7 Gray (1988) accounting values: 
i. Professionalism versus statutory control: A preference for the exercise of individual 
professional judgment and the maintenance of professional self-regulation as 
opposed to compliance with legal requirements and statutory control. 
ii. Uniformity versus flexibility: A preference for the enforcement of uniform 
accounting practices between companies and for the consistent use for such practices 
over time as opposed to flexibility in accordance with the perceived circumstances of 
individual companies.  
iii. Conservatism versus optimism: A preference for a cautious approach to measurement 
so as to cope with the uncertainty of future events as opposed to more optimistic.  
iv. Secrecy versus transparency: A preference for confidentiality and the restriction of 
disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely involved 
with its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and 
publicly accountable approach. 
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and high level of secrecy, uniformity and conservatism. Based on the outcome of the 
Hofstede-Gray framework, these will result in low compliance with legal 
requirements, low disclosure and less flexibility and optimism. Overall, we could 
conclude that the cultural traits coupled with accounting values, will result in the 
firms with higher level of Bumiputra directors to experience higher risk, as supported 
by Gul (2006), low level of disclosure in relations to financial reporting and less 
compliance (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) to capital markets regulations. Low disclosure 
reduces the quality of accounting information which leads to low accuracy analyst 
forecast. Study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) however find contradicting result to 
Hofstede-Gray theoretical framework. They find Bumiputra directors have more 
information disclosure which contradict with the Hofstede-Gray theory. Increase of 
accounting information quality enhances analysts forecast. Theoretical arguments 
raised by studies (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002, 2005) on socio-economy argument suggest 
that firms dominated by Bumiputras directors are rather weak in disclosure less 
compliance to rules and regulations.  
The political-economy argument is based on the notion of capital market 
development in Malaysia that initiated by the support to the Bumiputras. Malaysia 
capital market is largely developed based on relationship-based economy (Gul, 2006). 
The political economy argument raised by the likes of Gomez and Jomo (1999), 
Johnson and Mitton (2002), and Gul (2006) state that these firms are dependent on 
government funding and has less reliance on foreign funding, are inefficient, riskier 
due to uncertainty in their cash inflow and are less transparent. The outcomes of these 
two strands of arguments are rather similar. The outcome of these arguments suggest 
that the information environment is not as transparent as relative to firms not 
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dominated by Bumiputra directors and as such creates uncertainty in the accounting 
numbers made available to the public, or in this case, financial analysts. Since 
financial analysts, especially sell-side analysts depend on the readily available 
information or even purchased information from the firm, this will have an effect on 
the level of accuracy of their estimates.  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between Bumiputra cultural 
values and analysts’ forecast error. 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) provide the initial evidence on cultural values and 
corporate governance disclosure. Previous study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) used 
Hofstede-Gray framework to analyse the effect of culture on the shareholders 
information disclosure.  Based on Hofstede-Gray theoretical framework, the 
Bumiputras may be expected to be secretive and result in low disclosure. Based on the 
Hofstede-Gray framework, they predicted that Bumiputra directors are negatively 
related to corporate governance disclosure. However, they find a positive and 
significant relationship between the ratio of Bumiputra directors and voluntary 
disclosure.8 Since their findings contradict their prediction, they argue there could be 
other factors, such as religious values that could affect the disclosure quality by 
Bumiputra directors. Numerous studies have since, based on the findings of Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) embarked on investigating further the role of ethnicity or culture in 
Malaysia's capital market.  
 
                                                          




3.2 Corporate Governance and Analysts Forecast Error 
 
The central argument for this empirical prediction between corporate 
governance and analysts forecast revolves around information asymmetry caused by 
the agency conflict between managers and shareholders, or principal. The role of the 
corporate governance is to mitigate the information asymmetry and thus will make the 
information more transparent and available for shareholders or other stakeholders. In 
addition, good governance mitigates uncertainty in future earnings due to it expected 
monitoring role by various governance mechanisms. Bhat et al. (2006) state two 
reasons why corporate governance is important to financial analysts. The first reason 
related to the integrity of the financial disclosures since insiders are the major source 
of financial disclosure. The second reason relates to the role of corporate governance 
in reducing uncertainty surrounding future performance.  
The corporate governance mechanism in this paper comprises of duality, 
board independence, board size and ownership structures. Prior studies find the 
presence of CEO duality in an organisation reflects poor governance (Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996). Byrad et al. (2006) finds the presence of CEO duality in 
organisation has negative relationship with the accuracy of analysts’ forecast. Core et 
al. (1999) specify that fewer independent of Board of director cause for poor 
monitoring. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that adding more independent board 
will increase the company monitoring diligence. Thus, board independence has 
positive relationship with the accuracy of analysts’ forecast (Byrad et al., 2006). 
Board director size refers to the total number of directors in the organisation. Wan-
Hussin et al. (2010) finds that board size has negative relationship with (management) 
18 
 
analysts’ forecast. The participation of institutional ownership such as pension funds, 
trust funds and others, enhance monitoring and ensure that firm performance is enable 
to provide return on investment. Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) find institutional 
ownership has positive relationship to company performance and analysts forecast. 
Therefore we state, the following hypothesis in the alternative form: 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between corporate governance 
variables and analysts’ forecast error 
3.3 Culture, Corporate Governance and Analysts Forecast Error 
 
This empirical prediction investigates effect on corporate governance on the 
relationship between culture and analyst forecast error.  We predicted earlier that a 
positive relationship exist between culture and analysts' forecast error, which means 
that the higher proportion of Bumiputra directors lead to larger forecast error. In 
contrast, we predicted a negative relationship between corporate governance variables 
and forecast error. Since corporate governance is expected to enhance monitoring, one 
would expect that the positive relationship between culture and forecast error would 
be weaker for firms with good governance. Therefore we state the following 
hypothesis, in alternative form: 
 
H3: The positive relationship between cultural values and analysts 




4. Data and Research Methods 
This study is based on sample of 664 firm-year observations presenting 193 firms 
listed on Bursa Malaysia for period of 1999 to 2009. The sample firms from the 
Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database are used and matched them 
with Compustat Global for firm specific information. Next, the corporate governance 
variables and Bumiputra directors from annual reports for firm were identified. We 
posit the following regression model to test our hypotheses: 
 
FEit =α0 + β1BUMI + B2DUALITYit + β3BODINDit + β4LNBODSIZEit + β5 
INSTOWNit+ β6MANOWNit+ β7LNNUMESTit+ β8LNHORIZONit+   
β9MKTCAP*it + β10 BIGNit + β11 XLISTit + β12STROAit + 
β13INDUSTRIESit+ β14PERIODit + εit 
 
4.1 Measure for Analysts Forecast Error 
 
The dependent variable in the above equation is accuracy of analysts’ forecast. 
Chang et al. (2007) use forecast error to measure firm performance; Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2010) use analysts forecast to examine quality of accounting information. 
Byard et al. (2010) use forecast error to measure transparency of financial reporting. 
Unlike other studies mentioned above, this study  used forecast error to measure effect 
of corporate governance and culture to accuracy of analysts’ forecast. Accuracy of 
analysts forecast is measured by forecast error (FE). In formula form, forecast error 




FORECAST ERROR (FE) =  LN (ABS (  �Actual Forecast-Median Forecast�(Price)  )) 
 
 
Where ACTUAL FORECAST is the actual annual earnings as reported by 
I/B/E/S; MEDIAN FORECAST is the median of analysts’ forecast for a year period; 
and PRICE is the stock price last day prior the announcement date of earning per 
share.  
4.2 Culture (BUMI) 
 
Similar to numerous Malaysian studies (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Syed 
Mustapha Nazri et al., 2012), we opted for the percentage of Bumiputra directors as 
our choice of culture variable. In addition, since our arguments are based from the 
well-established Hofstede-Gray framework, it is only logical to choose an ethnic 
group as our proxy for culture. Bumiputra directors (BUMI) is measured as the 
percentage of Bumiputra directors on the board.  
 
4.3 Corporate Governance9  
 
This study will look into four (4) dimensions of corporate governance factors; 
duality (DUALITY), board independence (BODIND), and board size (BODSIZE) as 
                                                          
9 When studying the association between corporate governance and analysts forecast, we treat 
governance structures as exogenous. Our approach is the same as that of Core et al. (1999) where they 
observe that ‘‘Following most prior empirical research in this area, we treat the board and ownership 
structures as exogenous, when economic theory would argue that these variables are endogenous.’’ 
This well-established approach of treating governance structures as exogenous is reasonable, in the 
sense that some institutional features of contracting cause governance characteristics to be ‘‘sticky.’’ 
For example, directors serve for fixed terms, so naturally it takes time to change board members to 
adjust to a changed operating environment. Consistent with many prior studies, we argue that it is 
difficult for firms to have optimal governance structures at all times (e.g., see Larcker et al., 2007). 
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internal governance while external governance is tested by institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN).  
4.3.1 Duality (DUALITY) 
 
Duality (DUALITY) refers to separation of chief executive officer (CEO) from 
the chairman of the board. This variable is measured as a dummy variable equal to 
one when CEO and chairman is separated or zero otherwise. MCCG (2001) 
recommends a separation between the position of CEO and chairman to ensure a 
balance of power and authority. Proponents of combining these positions suggest that 
such method helps the person-in-charge and will have minimal interference in relation 
to decision making. In addition, combining such position will enhance and hasten 
decision making process and ensure that objectives of the firms are being met in a 
timely manner (Dahya et al., 1996). Opponents of having these two positions given to 
an individual suggest that the CEO needs monitoring and such practice could lead to 
opportunistic behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1993) and Yermack 
(1996) argue that the combination of these two positions to a sole individual is an 
indicator of poor governance. We predict a negative relationship between DUALITY 
and FE suggesting that firms that separate the CEO and Chairman functions will have 
better monitoring function and thus provide better governance mechanism for the 
firm. Therefore, it create better information environment and creates transparency. 
Byard et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between firms that combine such 




4.3.2 Board Independence (BODIND) 
 
Our second corporate governance variable is board independence which is the 
proportion of independent directors on the board of directors. The premise of this 
variable resides on the notion of agency issues between the managers or directors and 
shareholders whom are the owners of the firms. The presence of independent directors 
mitigate any agency problem by exercising proper monitoring on executive directors. 
Core et al. (1999) indicate that less independent outside directors provide poor 
monitoring and thus we expect a negative relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and analysts forecast error. Klein (2002) finds that independent 
directors on board improve the integrity of the financial accounting process through 
their more effective monitoring. Further, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
effectiveness of board monitoring depends on the independence of board members. 
Adut et al. (2011) find that the percentage of independent directors is related to 
likelihood of meeting and exceeding consensus forecast. Byard et al. (2006) find a 
positive and significant relationship between the percentage of independent directors 
and forecast accuracy.  
 
4.3.3  Board Size (LNBODSIZE) 
 
 Our third internal corporate governance mechanism is the size of board of 
directors. The effect of board size is rather ambiguous. Small boards are viewed to be 
more effective as they could make sound decision in a shorter period of time as 
relative to a bigger board (Jensen, 1993). As such, as the number of board of directors 
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grows, policies are being argued thoroughly and could make the decisions being 
conveyed at a slower pace and make them less effective (Yermack, 1996). 
Furthermore, as the number of directors grows, the role of board of directors is rather 
symbolic rather than serving a monitoring purpose (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2000). 
Hence, one could view that the monitoring by board of directors weaken as their 
number grows.  
 Alternatively, the number of directors could demonstrate economies of scale. 
It could provide resources to the firms through the connections obtain from directors. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2005) argue that a small board may be seen to be more effective 
to improve performance and to limit directors’ incentives to shirk, as the role 
performance of each member is easier to monitor and decisions can be made more 
quickly. On the other hand, bigger boards could provide the diversity needed to secure 
critical resources and contacts. Byard et al. (2006) find a negative relationship 
between the total number of directors on board and forecast accuracy suggesting that 
the larger the board, the less effective it will be in relationship of monitoring and good 
governance. Based on these competing arguments, we predict a relationship between 
the number of directors on the board and forecast accuracy. Our operational definition 
for board size is the natural log transformation of the number of directors on board 
(LNBODSIZE).  
 
4.3.4 Institutional Ownership (INSTOWN) 
 
 Our external corporate governance mechanism is the percentage of top five (5) 
institutional ownership. Institutional investors are expected to play a fiduciary role 
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and acts in the best interest of their contributors (Hawley & Williams, 1997). In 
addition, Jennings (2005) argues that the size of the institutional investors could act as 
an important tool to exert influence over their investments. The expectations of such 
role for institutional investors in Malaysia are no different. In addition, the 
establishment of Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group in 2001 in Malaysia act as a 
catalyst for institutional investors in Malaysia to play a more active role in corporate 
governance in Malaysia.  
 Evidence of the governance role of institutional investors in Malaysia is rather 
consistent. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. In addition, Abdul Wahab et al. (2008) 
find a positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
corporate governance. Ammer and Abdul Rahman (2011) find firms targeted by 
institutional investors experience abnormal returns surrounding the announcement by 
them. Therefore, we predict a negative relationship between institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) and FE. 
4.4 Other Determinants of Analysts Forecast  
 
Direct managerial ownership MANOWN is the proportion of shares held by 
CEO and executive directors.  Baik et al. (2007) find analysts’ forecasts declines as 
managerial ownership increases. Analysts following (LNNUMEST) are the natural log 
transformation of the numbers of analysts following a firm. Eng and Mark (2003) find 
analyst following is negatively correlated to forecast error. Thus, we predict negative 
relationship between analysts following and analysts forecast error. Forecast horizon 
(LNHORIZON) is the natural log transformation of the day’s basis which calculates 
the difference between the actual date and forecast date. Previous study finds shorten 
forecast horizon tend to result in less error and are less extreme (Capstaff et al., 1995). 
This means the longer the forecast horizon, the more exposure to error and more 
extreme. Thus, we predict positive relationship between forecast horizon and analysts 
forecast error. Firm size refers to firm's market capitalisation (MKTCAP). Company 
assets show the capability and strength of the market to compete in the market. Jelic et 
al. (1998) argues positive relationship between the larger firm sizes to forecast 
accuracy. Thus, we predict negative relationship between firm size and analysts 
forecast error.  Auditor size (BIGN) comprised of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG and PriceWaterhouse Coopers. This variable is measured as a dummy 
variable equal to one when firm appoint Big 4 or zero otherwise. Behn et al. (2008) 
suggest that financial reporting reliability increases with audit quality, which they 
infer from auditor size and industry specialisation. Behn et al. (2008) state that brand 
name auditors are viewed as providing higher quality audits based on their perceived 
competence and independence. Therefore, it is likely that a financial analysts forecast 
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ability increases with the quality or reliability of financial information they use to 
predict future earnings (Behn et al., 2008).  Therefore, we predict negative 
relationship between BIGN and analysts forecast error. 
 XLIST takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross listed overseas. Risk refers to 
firms’ standard deviation on return on asset (STROA). This variable determines the 
firm level of uncertainty in market condition. The risk is measured on the return on 
asset over three years. Huang et al. (2006) find firm with low risk has better corporate 
governance and better accuracy of analysts forecast. We predict positive relationship 
between standard deviation of return on asset and analyst forecast.  
 We have included industries dummies (INDUSTRIES) to control for the 
variation on analysts forecast among industries in Malaysia.10 Further, to control for 
any unobserved effect during the sample period, we have included year dummies 
(PERIOD) for the years 2007 and 2008.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4.5 Sample Description  
Table 3 presents the firm-year observations based on the industries. Consumer 
product based (CONSUMER) presents the highest 198 (29.82 percent) observations 
while the lowest firm-year observations is the health industry (HEALTH) at 15 (2.26 
percent). Construction based industry (CONSTRUCT) have the second highest 
number of firm-year observations at 125 (18.83 percent).  
                                                          
10 The industries classification for this study are: agriculture, construction, manufacturing, consumer, 
transportation, wholesale, health, hotel and others.  
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Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics. The average FE is -4.334 with a 
range between -10.113 to 3.260. Panel B tabulates the descriptive figures for the 
independent variables. The average number of Bumiputra directors (BODBUMI) 
stands at 3.15 with a maximum participation of 12 directors. On average there are 
43% of Bumiputra directors (BUMI) on board. Further, 68.6 percent of sample firms 
separate (DUALITY) the CEO and Chairperson functions. While 36 percent of the 
directors on board are independent (BODIND) with a maximum percentage of nearly 
86 percent. This percentage supports the current rules and regulations by both the 
MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements that at least a third of the directors 
must be independent. The average size for board of directors (BODSIZE) is 7.23 
directors with a range of between three (3) to 17 directors. The mean percentage for 
institutional shareholdings (INSTOWN) is 17.04 percent with a maximum of 94 
percent of total shareholdings of firms.  
 Panel C of Table 4 tabulates the descriptive results for the control variables. 
Direct managerial shareholdings (MANOWN) averages at 5.218 percent with a 
maximum of 70.755 percent. The average number of analysts (NUMEST) following a 
firm is 6.447 with a range of between 1 to 31 analysts. The forecast horizon 
(HORIZON) averages 56.74 days with a maximum number of days difference of 330 
between the forecast and actual announcement of the earnings figure. 76.1 percent of 
the sample firms are audited by Big 4 auditors and only 6.2 percent of sample firms 
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are cross listed (XLIST) abroad. The average STROA is 4.997 with a maximum of 
41.971.  
 
 [Table 4 about here] 
 
5. Results  
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
 Table 5 tabulates the correlations analysis for the variables used in this study. 
Both Pearson (0.111, p<0.01) and Spearman-rank (0.112, p<0.01) correlations 
between FE and BUMI record a positive and significant relationship, providing initial 
evidence that the higher proportion of Bumiputra directors result in larger forecast 
error. We observed negative and significant correlations (both Pearson and Spearman-
rank) between FE and LNNUMEST and MKTCAP*. Further, a positive and significant 
correlations for Pearson (0.170, p>0.01) and Spearman-rank (0.146, p<0.01) giving 
initial support that the larger the forecast horizon the larger the forecast error. Overall 
results suggest no severe multicollinearity problem exist in the regressions.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 We extend the univariate analysis by examining the differences in mean and 
median between firms that are below and above the median value for the number of 
Bumiputra directors, presented in Table 6. We find significant differences for both 
mean and median between these two samples for FE as the firms with more than three 
(3) Bumiputra directors record significantly higher forecast error. We observed 
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significant differences between these two samples for the corporate governance 
variables, with the exception of BODIND. Both of our univariate analysis provide 
support that a positive relationship exist between the proportion of Bumiputra 
directors and forecast error.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis  
Table 7 tabulates the regression analysis.11 Column 1 of Table 7 presents the 
results without the interaction terms between BUMI and the corporate governance 
variables.  Column 1 of Table 7 documents a positive and significant relationship 
between BUMI and FE (0.008, t=2.979, p<0.01). This supports our hypothesis that 
Bumiputra directors are more secretive and low on disclosure, which is based on the 
Hofstede-Gray framework. This finding also support our second argument that firms 
with Bumiputra directors showed characteristics  of political connections in which 
these firms are inefficient (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) and weak on corporate 
governance. The positive relationship also suggests that these firms have less amount 
of information for financial analysts to assess and make sound judgment from. We 
find a significantly positive relationship between LNBODSIZE and FE (0.895, 
t=2.840, p<0.01), inferring that the larger the board of directors, the larger the 
forecast error.  Our results support the argument raised by Yermack (1996) that bigger 
                                                          
11 For the sake of brevity, the regressions are presented without the coefficients for industries and 
period dummies. The industries variables (based on Table 3), yield insignificant results. Therefore, we 
could conclude that the variation of analysts forecast error are not affected by industry classifications. 
In addition, the period F test for the period is 2.169, p<0.05. Therefore, the period effects during the 
sample period are significant. Regression results with industries and period dummies can be obtain 
from the corresponding author.   
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boards are less effective in terms of monitoring. We could not find any support for the 
remaining corporate governance variables effects on the forecast error. Our main 
control variables which are analysts following (LNNUMEST), forecast horizon 
(LNHORIZON) and firm size (MKTCAP) are significant and remain robust throughout 
the regressions models.  
We extended the initial regression model by introducing interaction terms 
from column 2 to column 6, in which column 6 presents the final regression that 
includes all the interaction terms between corporate governance variables and BUMI. 
The only interaction term that is significant is BUMI and BODIND which is positively 
associated with FE. Based on column 3 and 6, the coefficient of BUMI*BODIND 
suggest that the presence of Bumiputra directors weakens the negative, but 
insignificant relationship between BODIND and FE.  
 
 [Table 7 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
 We investigate the relationship between cultural values, proxy by the 
proportion of Bumiputra directors on board and analysts forecast error. Further, we 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and forecast error. We find 
a positive relationship between the proportion of Bumiputra directors and forecast 
error. Our findings support the Hofstede-Gray framework which suggests that 
Bumiputras are individualistic and secretive that leads to less disclosure quality. As 
for our corporate governance mechanisms, we find a positive relationship between 
size of the board of directors and forecast error. We then extended our analysis by 
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examining the interaction term between culture and corporate governance against 
forecast error. We find that the presence of corporate governance mechanisms do not 
improve or weakens the positive relationship between culture and forecast error.  
 Our study is not without any caveats. Our study depends on data availability 
from the I/B/E/S database and that could represent some degree of biasness towards 
our findings. Furthermore, due to lack of data availability, we did not control for other 
variables that are proven to be significant in Malaysia's capital market such as the role 
of audit committee. However, we view our study as catalysts for further research on 
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Appendix A: Ownership of Share Capital in Limited Firms (1969-2008) 
           
 
1969 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2008 
Total Bumiputras 1.5 2.4 9.2 12.4 18.5 19.3 20.6 18.9 18.9 21.9 
Individual 1.0 1.6 3.6 4.3 n/a 14.2 18.6 14.2 15.0 n/a 
Institutions 0.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.0 2.2 n/a 
Trust Agencies n/a 0.8 5.6 8.1 n/a 5.1 2.0 1.7 1.7 n/a 
           Total Non-
Bumiputras 34.3 34.3 37.5 40.1 49.5 46.8 43.4 41.3 40.6 36.7 
Chinese 22.8 27.2 n/a n/a 48.2 45.5 40.9 38.9 39.0 n/a 
Indian 0.9 1.1 n/a n/a 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.2 n/a 
Others 10.6 6.0 n/a n/a 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.4 n/a 
           Nominees 2.1 n/a n/a n/a 8.0 8.5 8.3 8.5 8.0 n/a 
Foreign 62.1 63.3 53.3 47.5 24.0 25.4 27.7 31.3 32.5 41.4 
           Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
            
Sources: 
Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Malaysia, 1971, p. 40) 
Third Malaysian Plan, 1976-1980 (Malaysia, 1976, p. 184) 
Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981-1985 (Malaysia, 1981, p. 61) 
Sixth Malaysian Plan, 1990-1995 (Malaysia, 1990, p. 13) 
Seventh Malaysian Plan, 1996-2000 (p.86) 
Ninth Malaysian Plan, 2006-2010 (Malaysia, 2006, p. 356-57) 
Tenth Malaysian Plan, 2011-2015 (Malaysia, 2011, p. 148) 
 
 
Table 1: Hofstede-Gray Framework (adopted from Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) 
 















Masculinity Low High secrecy Low disclosure 
Uncertainty avoidance High High uniformity Less flexibility 
Individualism Low High conservatism Less optimism 
 Chinese   




Masculinity Low Low secrecy High disclosure 
Uncertainty avoidance Low Low uniformity High flexibility 
Individualism High13 Low conservatism High optimism 
 
 
                                                          
12  Even though Gray (1988) hypothesises that a higher rank of professionalism is more likely when 
there are higher ranks of individualism and lower ranks of uncertainty avoidance and power distance, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) documents Chinese are more professional relative to Malays. Abdul Rashid 
and Ho (2003) further support this proposition by suggesting that Chinese dominates the business 
ethics in relationships with suppliers and other business partners in Malaysia.     
13  According to Hofstede (1991), Chinese rank low on individualism. However, the study by Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) document that Chinese have relatively high ranking of individualism compared to 
the Malay groups.   
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Table 2: Operational Definition of Variables 
 












Forecast error defined as the 
natural log transformation of 
the absolute value of the 
differences between actual 




Panel B: Independent Variables 
2 BUMI  Proportion of Bumiputras 
directors on board of 
directors 
Hand collected 
3 DUALITY  Takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO separates from the 
Chairman 
Hand collected 
4 BODIND  Percentage of independent 
directors on board 
Hand collected 
5 BODSIZE  Natural log transformation of 
total number of directors on 
board 
Hand collected 
6 INSTOWN  % ownership by top 5 
institutional investors 
Hand collected 
Panel C: Control Variables 
7 MANOWN   Direct managerial 
shareholdings 
Hand collected 
8 LNNUMEST  Natural log transformation of 
number of analysts following 
a firm 
I/B/E/S 
9 HORIZON  Natural log transformation of 
number of days between the 
forecast and actual 
announcement of EPS 
I/B/E/S 
10 MKTCAP*  Natural log transformation of 
market capitalisation 
Compustat Global, 
missing data hand 
collected. 
11 BIGN  An indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the 
auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 
zero otherwise 
Compustat Global, 
missing data hand 
collected 
12 XLIST  Takes the value of I if the 
firm is listed overseas  
Hand collected  
 STROA  Standard deviation of return 
on assets (rolling for 3 years) 
Compustat Global, 
missing data hand 
collected 
Panel D: Fixed Effects Variables 
13 INDUSTRIES  Industries dummies Compustat Global, 
missing data hand 
collected 
14 PERIOD  Year dummies - 
     




No of observations  % 
   AGRICULTURE 21 3.16 
CONSTRUCT 125 18.83 
MANUFACTURING 86 12.95 
CONSUMER 198 29.82 
TRANSPORTATION 56 8.43 
WHOLESALE 47 7.08 
HEALTH 15 2.26 
OTHERS 92 13.86 
HOTEL 24 3.61 
   Total 664 100.00 





Table 4: Descriptive Analysis (1999-2009, n=664) 
      
 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
    FE -4.334 -4.346 3.260 -10.113 1.751 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
    BODBUMI 3.150 3.000 12.000 0.000 2.317 
BUMI 43.049 37.500 100.000 0.000 29.448 
DUALITY 0.686 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.465 
BODIND 36.257 33.333 85.714 0.000 16.265 
BODSIZE 7.266 7.000 17.000 3.000 2.059 
LNBODSIZE 1.944 1.946 2.833 1.099 0.278 
INSTOWN 17.035 11.499 94.371 0.000 18.627 
Panel C: Control Variables 
    MANOWN 5.218 0.191 70.755 0.000 12.302 
NUMEST 6.447 3.000 31.000 1.000 7.298 
LNNUMEST 1.220 1.099 3.434 0.000 1.148 
HORIZON 56.740 42.000 330.000 11.000 59.313 
LNHORIZON 3.745 3.738 5.799 2.398 0.697 
MKTCAP 1806342611.328 638396694.200 47008692268.000 12658180.000 3691550517.983 
MKTCAP* 20.367 20.274 24.574 16.354 1.336 
BIGN 0.761 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.427 
XLIST 0.062 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.241 
STROA 4.997 3.827 41.971 0.000 4.666 
      FE is natural log transformation of absolute forecast error scaled by share price. BODBUMI is the number of Bumiputra directors 
on board. BUMI is percentage of Bumiputra directors on board. DUALITY takes the value of 1 if the firm separates the CEO and 
Chairman functions. BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on board. BODSIZE is the total number of directors on 
board. LNBODSIZE is the natural log transformation of the total number of directors. INSTOWN is the percentage of top 5 
institutional shareholders. MANOWN is direct managerial shareholdings. NUMEST is the number of analysts following a firm. 
LNNUMEST is the natural log transformation of NUMEST. HORIZON is the number of days between the forecast date and 
actual announcement of earnings while LNHORIZON is natural log transformation of HORIZON. MKTCAP is total market 
capitalisation and MKTCAP* is natural log transformation of MKTCAP. BIGN takes the value of 1 if the auditor is Big 4 auditor. 









Table 5: Correlations (1999-2009, n=664) 
              
 
FE BUMI  DUALITY  BODIND BODSIZE INSTOWN MANOWN  LNNUMEST  HORIZON MKTCAP BIGN  XLIST STROA  
              FE 
 
0.112*** 0.006 0.038 0.081** 0.028 -0.016 -0.248*** 0.146*** -0.160*** -0.062 0.019 -0.062 
BUMI  0.111*** 
 
0.008 0.168*** 0.063 0.252*** -0.029 0.088** -0.144*** -0.016 -0.064* -0.087** -0.044 
DUALITY  0.007 -0.003 
 
-0.062 0.044 0.020 -0.150*** 0.037 -0.024 -0.006 0.091** -0.096** -0.065* 
BODIND 0.044 0.171*** -0.071* 
 
-0.287*** 0.050 -0.066* 0.025 -0.023 -0.013 -0.026 0.006 0.022 
BODSIZE 0.061 0.023 0.059 -0.196*** 
 
0.102*** 0.142*** 0.077** -0.145*** 0.078** 0.099** 0.005 0.065* 
INSTOWN 0.044 0.269*** 0.095** 0.079** 0.073* 
 
-0.116*** 0.226*** -0.040 0.216*** 0.120*** 0.048 -0.109*** 
MANOWN  -0.005 -0.020 -0.077** 0.053 -0.008 -0.112*** 
 
-0.133*** 0.087** -0.299*** -0.110*** -0.043 0.180*** 
LNNUMEST  -0.238*** 0.066* 0.031 0.021 0.097** 0.153*** -0.187*** 
 
-0.193*** 0.588*** 0.143*** 0.083** 0.007 
HORIZON 0.170*** -0.094** -0.010 -0.007 -0.116*** -0.042 0.129*** -0.235*** 
 
-0.112*** -0.041 -0.017 -0.090*** 
MKTCAP -0.179*** -0.041 0.001 0.001 0.073* 0.211*** -0.271*** 0.584*** -0.161*** 
 
0.156*** 0.127*** -0.111*** 
BIGN  -0.052 -0.064* 0.091** -0.015 0.119*** 0.149*** -0.051 0.150*** -0.040 0.148*** 
 
0.114*** -0.014 
XLLIST 0.014 -0.099** -0.096** 0.024 0.015 0.097** -0.047 0.087** -0.016 0.160*** 0.114*** 
 
-0.007 
STROA  -0.042 -0.079** -0.078** -0.004 0.010 -0.100*** 0.171*** -0.038 -0.050 -0.097** -0.024 -0.036 
 
              FE is natural log transformation of absolute forecast error scaled by share price. BODBUMI is the number of Bumiputra directors on board. BUMI is percentage of Bumiputra directors on board. DUALITY takes the 
value of 1 if the firm separates the CEO and Chairman functions. BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on board. BODSIZE is the total number of directors on board. LNBODSIZE is the natural log 
transformation of the total number of directors. INSTOWN is the percentage of top 5 institutional shareholders. MANOWN is direct managerial shareholdings. NUMEST is the number of analysts following a firm. 
LNNUMEST is the natural log transformation of NUMEST. HORIZON is the number of days between the forecast date and actual announcement of earnings while LNHORIZON is natural log transformation of 
HORIZON. MKTCAP is total market capitalisation and MKTCAP* is natural log transformation of MKTCAP. BIGN takes the value of 1 if the auditor is Big 4 auditor. XLIST takes the value 1 if the firm is cross listed 
overseas. STROA is the standard deviation of returns on assets.  
 
 
Table 6: Differences in Mean and Median between Bumiputras directors  
above and below the median value (1999-2009, n=664) 
       
 




 Mean  Median  Mean  Median (p-value) (p-value) 
       Panel A: Dependent Variable 
     FE -4.487 -4.459 -4.066 -4.095 0.076 0.041 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
     BODBUMI 1.686 2.000 5.711 5.000 0.000 0.000 
BUMI 25.086 25.000 74.447 77.778 0.000 0.000 
DUALITY 0.681 1.000 0.694 1.000 (0.000) 
 BODIND 34.645 33.333 39.074 37.500 0.327 0.592 
BODSIZE 6.832 7.000 8.025 8.000 0.000 0.000 
LNBODSIZE 1.889 1.946 2.041 2.079 0.000 0.000 
INSTOWN 12.385 7.866 25.162 18.168 0.000 0.000 
Panel C: Control Variables 
      MANOWN 5.654 0.249 4.456 0.122 0.436 0.000 
NUMEST 6.002 2.000 7.223 4.000 0.064 0.121 
LNNUMEST 1.125 0.693 1.386 1.386 0.117 0.121 
HORIZON 60.513 43.000 50.145 38.000 0.765 0.002 
LNHORIZON 3.802 3.761 3.646 3.638 0.068 0.002 
MKTCAP  1989495576.210 617086527.400 1486203338.000 710392500.000 0.006 0.000 
MKTCAP* 20.341 20.241 20.411 20.381 0.000 0.000 
BIGN 0.747 1.000 0.785 1.000 (0.279) 
 XLIST 0.069 0.000 0.050 0.000 (0.674) 
 STROA 5.467 4.210 4.175 3.156 0.030 0.101 
        
FE is natural log transformation of absolute forecast error scaled by share price. BODBUMI is the number of Bumiputra directors on board. BUMI is 
percentage of Bumiputra directors on board. DUALITY takes the value of 1 if the firm separates the CEO and Chairman functions. BODIND is the 
percentage of independent directors on board. BODSIZE is the total number of directors on board. LNBODSIZE is the natural log transformation of the 
total number of directors. INSTOWN is the percentage of top 5 institutional shareholders. MANOWN is direct managerial shareholdings. NUMEST is 
the number of analysts following a firm. LNNUMEST is the natural log transformation of NUMEST. HORIZON is the number of days between the 
forecast date and actual announcement of earnings while LNHORIZON is natural log transformation of HORIZON. MKTCAP is total market 
capitalisation and MKTCAP* is natural log transformation of MKTCAP. BIGN takes the value of 1 if the auditor is Big 4 auditor. XLIST takes the 





Table 7: Regressions Analysis (1999-2009, n=664) 
 
 
      Variable Expected Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
Direction 1 2 3 4 5 6 
INTERCEPT ? -5.229 -5.457 -5.038 -4.191 -5.228 -3.658 
 
 -2.930*** -3.045*** -2.830*** -2.083** -2.927*** -1.802* 
BUMI + 0.008 0.012 -0.001 -0.010 0.009 -0.027 
 
 2.979*** 2.595** -0.197 -0.578 2.391** -1.357 
DUALITY - 0.046 0.284 0.029 0.023 0.046 0.240 
 
 0.286 1.007 0.182 0.142 0.285 0.857 
BODIND - 0.005 0.006 -0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.006 
 
 1.135 1.232 -0.587 1.163 1.136 -0.812 
LNBODSIZE ? 0.895 0.927 0.962 0.425 0.894 0.299 
 
 2.840*** 2.934*** 3.047*** 0.793 2.831*** 0.560 
INSTOWN - 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 
 
 0.186 0.265 0.101 0.052 0.184 0.333 
MANOWN + -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
 
 -1.754* -1.763* -1.604 -1.757* -1.755* -1.591 
LNNUMEST - -0.281 -0.277 -0.283 -0.279 -0.282 -0.274 
 
 -3.579*** -3.513*** -3.607*** -3.552*** -3.577*** -3.510*** 
LNHORIZON + 0.335 0.332 0.337 0.336 0.335 0.334 
 
 3.495*** 3.465*** 3.508*** 3.510*** 3.488*** 3.486*** 
MKTCAP* - -0.148 -0.143 -0.145 -0.152 -0.148 -0.145 
 
 -1.989* -1.925* -1.961* -2.036** -1.989* -1.963* 
BIGN - -0.018 -0.035 0.004 -0.034 -0.016 -0.027 
 
 -0.098 -0.196 0.022 -0.188 -0.089 -0.148 
XLIST - 0.572 0.597 0.617 0.567 0.570 0.641 
 
 1.573 1.642* 1.703* 1.562 1.564 1.771* 
STROA - 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 







































    
-0.101 -0.419 
Industry fixed  ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed  ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
      Adjusted R2  0.137 0.137 0.141 0.138 0.136 0.143 
F-statistic  4.193*** 4.107*** 4.188*** 4.114*** 4.063*** 3.978*** 
 
 
      FE is natural log transformation of absolute forecast error scaled by share price. BUMI is percentage of Bumiputra directors on board. 
DUALITY takes the value of 1 if the firm separates the CEO and Chairman functions. BODIND is the percentage of independent 
directors on board. BODSIZE is the total number of directors on board. LNBODSIZE is the natural log transformation of the total 
number of directors. INSTOWN is the percentage of top 5 institutional shareholders. MANOWN is direct managerial shareholdings. 
NUMEST is the number of analysts following a firm. LNNUMEST is the natural log transformation of NUMEST. LNHORIZON is 
natural log transformation of HORIZON. MKTCAP* is natural log transformation of MKTCAP. BIGN takes the value of 1 if the 
auditor is Big 4 auditor. XLIST takes the value 1 if the firm is cross listed overseas. STROA is the standard deviation of returns on 
assets.  
